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Abstract
We study the most famous example of a large financial market: the
Arbitrage Pricing Model, where investors can trade in a one-period
setting with countably many assets admitting a factor structure. We
consider the problem of maximising expected utility in this setting.
Besides establishing the existence of optimizers under weaker assump-
tions than previous papers, we go on studying the relationship be-
tween optimal investments in finite market segments and those in the
whole market. We show that certain natural (but nontrivial) conti-
nuity rules hold: maximal satisfaction, reservation prices and (convex
combinations of) optimizers computed in small markets converge to
their respective counterparts in the big market.
Keywords: Arbitrage Pricing Theory, Large markets, Maximisation of ex-
pected utility
JEL classification: D4; G1
1 Introduction
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) was conceived by [19] in order to derive the
conclusions of Capital Asset Pricing Model (see [14, 21]) from alternative
assumptions. These remarkable conclusions had a huge bearing on empirical
work but they somehow overshadowed the highly inventive model suggested
in [19].
Mathematical finance subsequently took up the idea of a market with
countably many assets and the theory of large financial markets was founded
in [9] and further developed in e.g. [10, 12, 13, 11, 4], just to mention a
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few. For the sake of generality, continuous trading was assumed in the
overwhelming majority of related papers which, again, eclipsed the original
setting of [19].
While the arbitrage theory of the large financial markets has been worked
out in [9, 10] satisfactorily in continuous time, other crucial topics – such
as utility maximization or superreplication – brought about only dubious
conclusions and unsettled questions. Portfolios in finitely many assets were
considered in the above references and a natural definition for strategies
involving possibly all the assets was missing. Generalized portfolios were
introduced (see [6, 4, 15]) as suitable limits of portfolios with finitely many
assets. They lacked, however, a clear economic interpretation. In the APT
(and, for the moment, only in that model) [17] introduces a straightforward
concept of portfolios in infinitely many assets which we will use in the present
paper. In [2] it is proved that assuming absence of arbitrage in all of the small
markets and under integrability conditions, the no arbitrage condition stated
with infinitely many assets also holds true. In the same paper, the authors
obtain a dual representation of the superreplication cost of a contingent
claim.
In this paper, we investigate the existence of optimizers for utility func-
tions on the whole real line (the positive real axis case was treated in [2]) and
we relax some rather stringent conditions imposed in [17, 18]. From both
a theoretical and a computational viewpoint it is crucial to clarify the rela-
tionship between optimal investment in the finite markets and those in the
whole market. In our setup, it is expected that the value functions in finite
markets perform asymptotically as well as the value function in the large
market. Considering utility indifference prices, these should also converge
as the number of assets increases. While these facts are intuitive, no formal
justification has been provided so far. We prove these facts in Theorem 3.8
and Corollary 3.10 below. We also prove that certain convex combinations
of the optimal portfolios in finite markets perform asymptotically as well as
the overall optimizer.
Asymptotic results for superhedging and mean-variance hedging have
been obtained in [1, 3]. In the utility maximization context the first such
result is Theorem 5.3 of [17] where it was shown that there exists a sequence
of strategies in finite markets whose values converge to the optimal value.
That paper, however, assumed that asset price changes may take arbitrarily
large negative and positive values which is a rather strong requirement.
Under the more relaxed conditions of the present work we also show the
existence of such sequence, moreover, they can be chosen to be averages of
finite market optimizers, see Theorem 3.8 below.
Section 2 presents the model and recalls some useful results from [2].
Section 3 contains the main contributions: existence of utility maximization
and the asymptotics from small markets to big markets.
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2 The large market model
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space. We consider a two stage Arbitrage
Pricing Model. For any i ≥ 1, let the return on asset i be given by
Ri = β¯i(εi − bi), 1 ≤ i ≤ m;
Ri =
m∑
j=1
βji (εj − bj) + β¯i(εi − bi), i > m,
where the (εi)i≥1 are random variables and (β¯i)i≥1, (bi)i≥1, (β
j
i )i>m,1≤j≤m
are constants. We refer to [9, 16, 18] for further discussions on the model.
Assumption 2.1 The (εi)i≥1 are square-integrable, independent random
variables satisfying
E(εi) = 0, E
(
ε2i
)
= 1, i ≥ 1.
We consider strategies using potentially infinitely many assets and belonging
to
ℓ2 :=
{
(hi)i≥1 : hi ∈ R, i ≥ 1,
∞∑
i=1
h2i <∞
}
which is an Hilbert space with the norm ||h||ℓ2 :=
√∑∞
i=1 h
2
i .
Let L2(Ω,F , P ) := {X : Ω→ R, E|X|2 <∞} (denoted by L2(P ) from now
on), which is again a Hilbert space with the norm ||X||L2 :=
√
E(|X|2).
For h ∈ ℓ2, let Φ(h) :=
∑∞
i=1 hiεi, where the infinite sum in Φ(h) has to
be understood as the limit in L2(P ) of the finite sequences (
∑n
i=1 hiεi)n≥1.
Then Φ is an isometry from ℓ2 to L
2(P ).
Assumption 2.2 We have ‖b‖ℓ2 <∞.
Under Assumption 2.2, we have (see (5) in [2]) that
E
( ∞∑
i=1
hi(εi − bi)
)2 ≤ (1 + ‖b‖2ℓ2)‖h‖2ℓ2 <∞, (1)
and we may consider again the infinite sum 〈h, ε − b〉 :=
∑∞
i=1 hi(εi − bi).
Note that
E(|〈h, ε − b〉|) ≤
√
E (〈h, ε − b〉)2 ≤
√
1 + ‖b‖2ℓ2‖h‖ℓ2 .
The (self-financed) value at time 1 that can be attained starting from x and
using a strategy h in ℓ2 with infinitely many assets is given by
V x,h := x+ 〈h, ε − b〉.
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Assumption 2.3 For all i ≥ 1,
P (εi > bi) > 0 and P (εi < bi) > 0.
Fix N ≥ 1. Using Lemma 3.3 in [2], under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.3, there
exists some αN ∈ (0, 1) such that for every (h1, . . . , hN ) ∈ R
N satisfying∑N
i=1 h
2
i = 1 we have
P
(
N∑
i=1
hi(εi − bi) < −αN
)
> αN . (2)
This condition is the so called quantitative no-arbitrage condition on any
“small market” with N random sources and it is well-known that this con-
dition is equivalent to the existence of a equivalent martingale measure for
the finite market with asset R1, . . . , RN (see [5] and [7]).
However, we need the existence of martingale measures for the whole
market and even sufficient integrability of the martingale density. We say
that EMM2 holds true if
M2 :=
{
Q ∼ P,
dQ
dP
∈ L2(P ), EQ(εi) = bi, ∀i ≥ 1
}
6= ∅. (3)
Unfortunately, Assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 are not known to be suffi-
cient for ensuring that EMM2 holds true (see Proposition 4 of [16]). Hence
we also need the following technical condition.
Assumption 2.4 We have that
sup
i≥1
E
[
|εi|
3
]
<∞. (4)
Lemma 2.5 Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.3 and 2.4,
Assumption 2.2⇐⇒ EMM2. (5)
Proof. This is Corollary 1 of [16]. ✷
Lemma 2.6 below asserts that the quantitative no arbitrage condition,
mentioned above, holds true in the large market, too.
Lemma 2.6 Assume that Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 hold true. Then
there exists some α > 0, such that for all h ∈ ℓ2 satisfying ‖h‖ℓ2 = 1
P (〈h, ε〉 < −α) > α.
Proof. This is Proposition 3.11 in [2]. ✷
Remark 2.7 If Q ∈ M2 is such that dQ/dP ∈ L
2 and if Assumption 2.2
holds true then EQ
(
V 0,h
)
= 0 for all h ∈ ℓ2, see Remark 3.4 of [2].
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Lemma 2.8 below will be used in the proofs of Theorems 3.7 and 3.8 in
order to show uniform integrability.
Lemma 2.8 Assume that supi≥1E|εi|
γ < ∞ for some γ ≥ 2. Then there
is a constant Cγ such that, for all h ∈ ℓ2
E|〈h, ε − b〉|γ ≤ Cγ‖h‖
γ
ℓ2
(1 + ‖b‖γℓ2).
Proof. This is Lemma 3.7 in [2]. ✷
We note an important consequence: under Assumption 2.4, for any c > 0,
{|V x,h|, h ∈ ℓ2, ‖h‖ℓ2 ≤ c} are uniformly integrable.
3 Utility maximisation
It is standard (see [20]) to model economic agents’ preferences by concave
increasing utility functions U . So suppose that U : R → R is a concave
strictly increasing differentiable function and that for some x0 ∈ R
U(x0) = 0 and U
′(x0) = 1. (6)
For a claim G ∈ L0 and x ∈ R, we define
A(U,G, x) :=
{
h ∈ ℓ2, EU
−(V x,h −G) < +∞
}
.
Define the supremum of expected utility at the terminal date when delivering
a contingent claim G, starting from initial wealth x ∈ R, by
u(G,x) := sup
h∈A(U,G,x)
EU(V x,h −G). (7)
The following assumptions will be needed in Theorems 3.7 and 3.8.
Assumption 3.1 There exists some constants C1 ∈ (0,∞), C2 ∈ R+ and
β > 1 such that for all x ≤ x0
|U(x)| ≥ C1|x|
β − C2.
Assumption 3.2 There exists some constants C3 ∈ (0,∞), C4 ∈ R+ and
γ ≥ β ∧ 2 such that for all x ∈ R
U−(x) ≤ C3|x|
γ + C4
and
sup
i≥1
E [|εi|
γ ] <∞. (8)
Assumption 3.3 We have G ≥ 0 a.s. and it satisfies |E(U(x−G))| < +∞,
for all x ∈ R.
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Assumption 3.3 is satisfied, in particular, when G is measurable and
bounded.
Remark 3.4 Let U be concave, strictly increasing and differentiable, satisfy-
ing Assumptions 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. Then (6) actually imposes no restriction
on U . Indeed, as U cannot be constant, there exists x0 ∈ R such that
U ′(x0) > 0. Define
V (x) =
U(x)
U ′(x0)
−
U(x0)
U ′(x0)
,
which obviuosly satisfies (6). Moreover,
|V (x)| ≥
C1
U ′(x0)
|x|β −
C2
U ′(x0)
−
|U(x0)|
U ′(x0)
, x ≤ x0
V −(x) ≤
C3
U ′(x0)
|x|γ +
C4
U ′(x0)
+
U+(x0)
U ′(x0)
, x ∈ R
|E(V (−G))| ≤
|E(U(−G))|
U ′(x0)
+
|U(x0)|
U ′(x0)
<∞.
So Assumptions 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 hold true for V . One may apply Theorems
3.7, 3.8 and Corollary 3.10 below to V and then these same results can be
deduced for U , too.
The following lemmata will be used in the proofs of Theorems 3.7 and
3.8.
Lemma 3.5 Let Assumption 2.2 hold true and assume G ≥ 0 a.s. Then
for all y ∈ R and h ∈ ℓ2
U+(y + 〈h, ε− b〉 −G) ≤ |x0|+ |y + 〈h, ε− b〉|. (9)
Proof. As U is increasing, concave and differentiable, recalling (6), we get
for all y ∈ R,
U(y) ≤ U(max(x0, y)) ≤ U(x0) + max(y − x0, 0)U
′(x0)
≤ max(y − x0, 0) ≤ |y − x0| ≤ |y|+ |x0|.
Let h ∈ ℓ2, we get that
U+(y + 〈h, ε− b〉 −G) ≤ U+(y + 〈h, ε − b〉)
≤ U+(y + 〈h, ε− b〉)1y+〈h,ε−b〉≥x0 + U
+(x0)1y+〈h,ε−b〉<x0
= U(y + 〈h, ε− b〉)1y+〈h,ε−b〉≥x0 ≤ |x0|+ |y + 〈h, ε − b〉|.
✷
Lemma 3.6 asserts that an optimal solution for (7) must be bounded.
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Lemma 3.6 Assume that Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.1 and 3.3 hold
true. Let x ∈ R. There exists some constant Mx,G > 0 such that if h ∈ ℓ2
satisfies
‖h‖ℓ2 > Mx,G
then the 0 strategy performs better than h, that is,
EU(x−G) > EU(x+ 〈h, ε − b〉 −G).
Proof. Let x ∈ R and h ∈ ℓ2. Recall α > 0 from Lemma 2.6. As b ∈ ℓ2,
there exists some nα ≥ 1 such that
(∑
i≥nα+1
b2i
)1/2
≤ α/2. Let
h := (h1, . . . , hnα , 0, . . . , ) and b =: (b1, . . . , bnα , 0, . . . , )
h := (0, . . . , 0, hnα+1, . . . , ) and b =: (0, . . . , 0, bnα+1, . . . , ).
From the no arbitrage condition in the market with nα assets (see (2)) there
exits αnα such that P (A) > αnα , whereA := {
∑nα
i=1 hi(εi − bi) < −αnα‖h‖ℓ2}.
Let B :=
{∑
i≥nα+1
hiεi ≤ −α‖h‖ℓ2
}
then P (B) > α (recall Lemma 2.6).
As the (εi)i≥1 are independent, we get that P (A∩B) = P (A)P (B) > αnαα.
On A ∩B,
〈h, ε − b〉 = 〈h, ε− b〉+ 〈h, ε− b〉 ≤ −αnα‖h‖ℓ2 − α‖h‖ℓ2 − 〈h, b〉
≤ −αnα‖h‖ℓ2 − α‖h‖ℓ2 + ‖b‖ℓ2‖h‖ℓ2
≤ −αnα‖h‖ℓ2 − α‖h‖ℓ2 + α/2‖h‖ℓ2 ≤ −α(‖h‖ℓ2 + ‖h‖ℓ2),
where α = inf(αnα , α/2). Thus P (〈h, ε − b〉 < −α(‖h‖ℓ2 + ‖h‖ℓ2)) > αnαα.
Assume that ‖h‖ℓ2 + ‖h‖ℓ2 ≥ max
(
x−x0
α ,
|x|
α
)
. Then applying Lemma 3.5
and Assumption 3.1, we get that
EU(V x,h −G) ≤ EU(x+ 〈h, ε − b〉)
≤ E
(
U(x+ 〈h, ε − b〉)1〈h,ε−b〉<−α(‖h‖ℓ2+‖h‖ℓ2 )
)
+
E
(
U+(x+ 〈h, ε − b〉)1〈h,ε−b〉≥−α(‖h‖ℓ2+‖h‖ℓ2 )
)
≤ U(x− α(‖h‖ℓ2 + ‖h‖ℓ2))αnαα+ |x0|+ E|x+ 〈h, ε− b〉+ 〈h, ε− b〉|
≤ U(x− α(‖h‖ℓ2 + ‖h‖ℓ2))αnαα+ |x0|+ |x|+ ‖h‖ℓ2
√
1 + ‖b‖2ℓ2
+‖h‖ℓ2
√
1 + ‖b‖2ℓ2
≤
(
−C1
∣∣α(‖h‖ℓ2 + ‖h‖ℓ2)− x∣∣β + C2)αnαα+ |x0|+ |x|
+(‖h‖ℓ2 + ‖h‖ℓ2)
√
1 + ‖b‖2ℓ2
≤
(
−C1α
β(‖h‖ℓ2 + ‖h‖ℓ2)
β + C2
)
αnαα+ |x0|+ |x|
(‖h‖ℓ2 + ‖h‖ℓ2)
√
1 + ‖b‖2ℓ2 .
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because U(x− α(‖h‖ℓ2 + ‖h‖ℓ2)) ≤ U(x0) = 0 and∣∣α(‖h‖ℓ2 + ‖h‖ℓ2)− x∣∣β ≥ ∣∣α(‖h‖ℓ2 + ‖h‖ℓ2)− |x|∣∣β = (α(‖h‖ℓ2 + ‖h‖ℓ2)− |x|)β
≥ αβ(‖h‖ℓ2 + ‖h‖ℓ2)
β .
Assume that
(‖h‖ℓ2 + ‖h‖ℓ2)
√
1 + ‖b‖2ℓ2 −
C1
2
αnααα
β(‖h‖ℓ2 + ‖h‖ℓ2)
β < 0
−
C1
2
αβαnαα(‖h‖ℓ2 + ‖h‖ℓ2)
β + |x0|+ |x|+ C2αnαα < −|EU(x−G)| ≤ EU(x−G),
which is true if ‖h‖ℓ2 + ‖h‖ℓ2 > Mx,G, where
Mx,G := max
(2 |x0|+ |x|+ C2αnαα+ |E(U(x−G))|C1αnαααβ
) 1
β
,
2
√
1 + ‖b‖2ℓ2
C1αnααα
β

1
β−1
 .
Then, setting Mx,G := max
(
x−x0
α ,
|x|
α ,Mx,G
)
, if ‖h‖ℓ2 + ‖h‖ℓ2 > Mx,G,
EU(V x,h −G) < EU(x−G) (10)
so the strategy 0 performs better than h. It follows that ‖h‖ℓ2 > Mx,G
implies (10) since
‖h‖ℓ2 =
(
‖h‖2ℓ2 + ‖h‖
2
ℓ2
) 1
2 ≤ ‖h‖ℓ2 + ‖h‖ℓ2 .
✷
Now we present our first main result. We establish the existence of
an optimizer for the utility maximization problem. In [18] this was shown
assuming uniformly bounded exponential moments for the εi. In [17] the
moment condition was weak but it was assumed that all the εi take arbi-
trarily large negative and positive values. Here we do not need the latter
assumption and merely assume (4) and (8).
Theorem 3.7 Assume that Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3
hold true. Let x ∈ R. There exists h∗ ∈ A(U,G, x) such that
u(G,x) = EU(V x,h
∗
−G).
Proof. Let x ∈ R and let hn ∈ A(U,G, x) be a sequence such that
EU(V x,hn −G) ↑ u(G,x), n→∞.
If ‖hn‖ℓ2+‖hn‖ℓ2 > Mx,G, then using Lemma 3.6, we can replace hn by 0 and
still have a maximising sequence. So one can assume that supn∈N ‖hn‖ℓ2 ≤
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Mx,G < ∞. Hence as ℓ2 has the Banach-Saks Property, there exists a sub-
sequence (nk)k≥1 and some h
∗ ∈ ℓ2 such that for h˜n :=
1
n
∑n
k=1 hnk
‖h˜n − h
∗‖ℓ2 → 0, n→∞
for some h∗ ∈ ℓ2. Using (1), we get that
E〈h˜n − h
∗, ε− b〉2 ≤ ‖h˜n − h
∗‖2ℓ2(1 + ‖b‖
2
ℓ2)→ 0,
when n → ∞. In particular, 〈h˜n − h
∗, ε − b〉 → 0, n → ∞ in probability.
Hence also U(V x,h˜n − G) → U(V x,h
∗
− G) in probability by continuity of
U . We claim that the family U+(V x,h˜n −G), n ∈ N is uniformly integrable.
Indeed, from (9)
U+(V x,h˜n −G) ≤ |x0|+ |V
x,h˜n |.
We know that supn∈N ‖h˜n‖ℓ2 ≤ Mx,G < ∞. Hence from Assumption 2.4
(see Lemma 2.8), we get that {U+(V x,h˜n −G), hn ∈ ℓ2, ‖h˜n‖ℓ2 ≤ Mx,G} is
uniformly integrable. Fatou’s lemma used for −U− implies that
E
(
−U−(V x,h
∗
−G)
)
≥ lim sup
n→∞
E
(
−U−(V x,h˜n −G)
)
,
and uniform integrability guarantees that
lim
n→∞
E
(
U+(V x,h˜n −G)
)
= E
(
U+(V x,h
∗
−G)
)
.
Thus, by concavity of U
EU(V x,h
∗
−G) ≥ lim sup
n→∞
EU(V x,h˜n −G) ≥ lim
n→∞
EU(V x,hn −G) = u(G,x),
and the proof will be finished as soon as we show h∗ ∈ A(U,G, x). From
Assumption 3.2 and Lemma 2.8,
EU−(V x,h˜n −G) ≤ C3E|V
x,h˜n −G|γ + C4
≤ C3
(
2γ−1(|x|γ + E| < h˜n, ε− b > |
γ)
)
+ C4
≤ C3
(
2γ−1
(
|x|γ + CγM
γ
x,G
(
1 + ‖b‖γℓ2
)))
+ C4.(11)
Fatou’s lemma used for U− implies that
E
(
U−(V x,h
∗
−G)
)
≤ lim inf
n→∞
E
(
U−(V x,h˜n −G)
)
≤ C3
(
2γ−1
(
|x|γ + CγM
γ
x,G
(
1 + ‖b‖γℓ2
)))
+ C4.
✷
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We consider now the problem of optimization in the small market n with
only the random sources (εi)1≤i≤n. Let
An(U,G, x) :=
{
h ∈ ℓ2, hi = 0, ∀i ≥ n+ 1, EU
−(V x,h −G) < +∞
}
.
Note that An(U,G, x) ⊂ An+1(U,G, x) ⊂ . . . ⊂ A(U,G, x).We set for n ∈ N
un(G,x) := sup
h∈An(U,G,x)
EU(V x,h −G). (12)
Now we arrive at the principal message of our paper: optimization problems
in the small markets behave consistently with those on the big market, in a
natural way.
Theorem 3.8 Assume that Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3
hold true. Then for each x ∈ R, we have un(G,x) ↑ u(G,x), n→∞.
Let h∗n be an optimal solution for (12)
∗. Then there exists a subsequence
(nk)k≥1 and some ĥ ∈ ℓ2, optimal solution of (7), such that for ĥn :=
1
n
∑n
k=1 h
∗
nk
, ‖ĥn − hˆ‖ℓ2 → 0, n→∞.
Proof. The sequence un(G,x), n ∈ N is clearly non-decreasing and it is
bounded from above by u(G,x). Let h¯n := (h˜0, . . . , h˜n, 0, . . .), n ∈ N where
h˜ is the optimizer constructed in Theorem 3.7. Using (1) and h˜ ∈ ℓ2, we
have
E〈h¯n − h˜, ε− b〉
2 → 0, n→∞
hence also 〈h¯n, ε− b〉 → 〈h˜, ε− b〉, n→∞ in probability. The Fatou-lemma
for U+ shows that
EU+(V x,h˜ −G) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
EU+(V x,h¯n −G).
Now we show that the family U−(V x,h¯n−G), n ∈ N is uniformly integrable.
As in (11) we get that
EU−(V x,h¯n −G) ≤ C3
(
2γ−1
(
|x|γ + CγM
γ
x,G
(
1 + ‖b‖γℓ2
)))
+ C4,
since h˜ is optimal and thus ‖h¯n‖ℓ2 ≤ ‖h˜‖ℓ2 ≤ Mx,G (see Lemma 3.6). We
also obtain that h¯n ∈ An(G,U, x). Uniform integrability implies that
EU−(V x,h˜ −G) = lim
n→∞
EU−(V x,h¯n −G).
It follows that
u(G,x) = EU(V x,h˜−G) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
EU(V x,h¯n−G) ≤ lim
n→∞
un(G,x) ≤ u(G,x).
∗which exists by the argument of Theorem 3.7.
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Let h∗n ∈ A(U,G, x) be an optimal solution for (12). As in the proof of
Lemma 3.6, ‖h∗n‖ℓ2 ≤Mx,G. We proceed as in the proof of Theorem 3.7. By
the Banach-Saks Property, there exists a subsequence (nk)k≥1 such that for
ĥn :=
1
n
∑n
k=1 h
∗
nk
, ‖ĥn− ĥ‖ℓ2 → 0, n→∞ for some ĥ ∈ ℓ2. The arguments
of the proof of Theorem 3.7 apply verbatim and show that ĥ is an optimizer
for the utility maximization problem (7) in the large market.
✷
Remark 3.9 When U is strictly concave then the optimizer is unique and
hence h∗ of Theorem 3.7 equals ĥ of Theorem 3.8.
The corollary below addressees the problem of convergence of the reser-
vation prices pn, p. These latter were introduced in [8].
Corollary 3.10 Assume that Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.1, 3.2 and
3.3 hold true. The reservation price of G in the market with the random
sources (εi)1≤i≤n (resp. with (εi)i≥1) is defined as a solution of
un(G,x + pn) = un(0, x),
u(G,x + p) = u(0, x).
These quantities are well-defined and we have pn → p, n→∞.
Proof. We justify the definition of p, the case of pn being completely analo-
gous. We show that the set {u(G,x), x ∈ R} is the same as {u(0, x), x ∈ R}.
We claim that u(G,x), u(0, x) are finite for all x. Indeed, Assumption
3.3, Lemmata 3.5 and 3.6 imply that −∞ < u(G,x) ≤ u(0, x) < ∞. As u
is monotone, furthermore it is concave and thus continuous on its effective
domain, it suffices to show that
u(G,−∞) = u(0,−∞) = −∞, u(G,∞) = u(0,∞) = U(∞) (13)
and that u(G,x), u(0, x) < U(∞) for all x because in this case {u(G,x), x ∈
R} = {u(0, x), x ∈ R} = (−∞, U(∞)).
We first concentrate on the latter claim. If U(∞) = ∞ then this is
obvious. Otherwise denote h′, h′′ the strategies attaining u(0, x), u(G,x),
respectively. Then, by the strictly increasing property of U , we have
u(0, x) = EU(x+ 〈h′, ε− b〉) < EU(∞) = U(∞) (14)
and
u(G,x) = EU(x+ 〈h′′, ε− b〉 −G) < EU(∞) = U(∞).
Now we turn to showing (13). It is clear that u(G,∞), u(0,∞) ≤ U(∞)
and
u(0,∞) = lim
x→∞
u(0, x) ≥ lim
x→∞
U(x) = U(∞). (15)
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Assumption 3.3 and Fatou’s lemma also imply that
u(G,∞) ≥ lim inf
x→∞
u(G,x) ≥ lim inf
x→∞
EU(x−G) ≥ U(∞).
Since u(G,x) ≤ u(0, x), it is enough to establish limx→−∞ u(0, x) = −∞.
By concavity, this is clearly the case if u(0, ·) is not the constant function.
But if u(0, ·) = c then we would necessarily have c ≥ U(∞) by (15) which
contradicts (14).
We now turn to proving convergence. Arguing by contradiction let us
assume that, along a subsequence (which we continue to denote by n), one
has pn → p for some p < p (the case of a limit p > p is analogous). It follows
that there is N such that, for n ≥ N , pn < (p + p)/2 < p. Using Theorem
3.7, let h† ∈ A(G,U, x+ (p+ p)/2) ⊂ A(G,U, x+ p) satisfy
u(G,x + (p+ p)/2) = EU(x+ (p + p)/2 + 〈h†, ε− b〉 −G).
Then, the definition of the reservation prices and Theorem 3.8 imply that
lim sup
n→∞
un(G,x+ pn) ≤ lim sup
n→∞
un(G,x+ (p+ p)/2)
= u(G,x + (p+ p)/2) = EU(x+ (p + p)/2 + 〈h†, ε− b〉 −G)
< EU(x+ p+ 〈h†, ε− b〉 −G) ≤ u(G,x+ p)
= u(0, x) = lim
n→∞
un(0, x) = lim
n→∞
un(G,x+ pn),
a gross contradiction. ✷
Acknowledgments
M.R. was supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation
Office, Hungary [Grant KH 126505] and by the “Lendu¨let” programme of
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences [Grant LP 2015-6].
References
[1] M. Baran. Asymptotic pricing in large financial markets. Math. Methods
Oper. Res., 66:1–20, 2007.
[2] L. Carassus, M. Ra´sonyi. Risk-neutral pricing for APT. Preprint, 2019.
arXiv:1904.11252v1
[3] L. Campi. Mean-variance hedging in large financial markets. Stoch.
Anal. Appl., 27:1129–1147, 2009.
[4] C. Cuchiero, I. Klein and J. Teichmann. A new perspective on the
fundamental theorem of asset pricing for large financial markets. Theory
Probab. Appl., 60:561–579, 2016.
12
[5] R.C. Dalang, A. Morton, and W. Willinger. Equivalent martingale mea-
sures and no-arbitrage in stochastic securities market models. Stochas-
tics Stochastics Rep., 29:185–201, 1990.
[6] M. De Donno, P. Guasoni and M. Pratelli. Superreplication and util-
ity maximization in large financial markets. Stochastic Process. Appl.,
115:2006–2022, 2005.
[7] H. Fo¨llmer and A. Schied. Stochastic Finance: An Introduction in
Discrete Time. Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin, 2002.
[8] R. Hodges and K. Neuberger. Optimal replication of contingent claims
under transaction costs. Rev. Futures Mkts., 8:222-239, 1989.
[9] Yu. M. Kabanov and D. O. Kramkov. Large financial markets: asymp-
totic arbitrage and contiguity. Theory Probab. Appl., 39:182–187, 1994.
[10] Yu. M. Kabanov and D. O. Kramkov. Asymptotic arbitrage in large
financial markets. Finance Stoch., 2:143–172, 1998.
[11] I. Klein. A fundamental theorem of asset pricing for large financial
markets. Math. Finance, 10:443–458, 2000.
[12] I. Klein and W. Schachermayer. Asymptotic arbitrage in non-complete
large financial markets. Theory Probab. Appl., 41:780–788, 1996.
[13] I. Klein and W. Schachermayer. A quantitative and a dual version of
the Halmos-Savage theorem with applications to mathematical finance.
Ann. Probab., 24:867–881, 1996.
[14] J. Lintner. The valuation of risky assets and the selection of risky invest-
ments in stock portfolios and capital budgets. Rev. Econom. Statist.,
47:13–37, 1965.
[15] O. Mostovyi. Utility maximization in a large market. Math. Finance,
28:106–118, 2018.
[16] M. Ra´sonyi. Arbitrage pricing theory and risk-neutral measures. Decis.
Econ. Finance, 27:109–123, 2004.
[17] M. Ra´sonyi. Maximizing expected utility in the Aribtrage Pricing
Model. Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 454:127–
143, 2017.
[18] M. Ra´sonyi. On optimal strategies for utility maximizers in the Arbi-
trage Pricing Model. Int. J. Theor. Appl. Finan. vol. 19, paper no.
1650047, 2016.
13
[19] S. A. Ross. The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricing. J. Econom.
Theory, 13:341–360, 1976.
[20] J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior. Princeton University Press, 1944.
[21] W. Sharpe. Capital asset prices: a theory of market equilibrium under
conditions of risk. J. Finance, 33:885–901, 1964.
14
